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The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada  
and the United States: 
Controversy Over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social 
Institution 
 
Nicholas Bala* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATES ABOUT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN 
CANADA & THE UNITED STATES 
 
Marriage is one of the oldest social institutions, predating recorded 
history, law, and perhaps even religion. Marriage has not been a static 
social or legal institution, but rather has changed over the course of 
history in response to changing religious beliefs, social values and 
behaviors, technology, and even demographics. Similarly there is great 
variation today in marital behaviors, attitudes, and laws about marriage 
in different countries. 
Currently debates over whether and how to redefine marriage and 
marriage-like relationships to accommodate same-sex couples are raging 
across two neighboring North American jurisdictions, Canada and the 
United States. Major changes in marriage laws are inevitably 
controversial, with opponents of legal reform often raising the specter of 
dire social consequences if “traditional marriage” is altered.1 Previous 
changes in marriage laws both reflected and reinforced changes in 
attitudes towards behavior in marriage. Despite profound changes in the 
legal and social nature of marriage, marriage has remained a fundamental 
social institution, with primary responsibility for the nurturing and care 
of children. As a society changes, the question which must be faced is 
whether the legal rules that were developed in the past to govern the 
 *Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, Canada. Email nicholas.bala@queensu.ca. 
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment 
Symposium, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, Sept. 9, 2005. The writer wishes to 
acknowledge the research and editorial assistance of Ms. Katherine Duvall-Antonacopoulos 
(Queen’s University LL.B. 2006) and funding support from the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada. The information about Canada is accurate as of April 15, 2006, while 
the information about the USA is accurate as of September 15, 2005. Portions of this paper are a 
revised version of a paper presented at the International Society of Family Law World Conference in 
Salt Lake City, July 22, 2005.
 1. See, Tamar Lewin, Ideas & Trends: Untying the Knot; For Better or Worse: Marriage’s 
Stormy Future, N.Y. TIMES LATE EDITION, Nov. 23, 2003, at 1. 
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definition of marriage and spousal relationships continue to best meet 
current social, economic, cultural, and spiritual needs and circumstances. 
While the present controversy centers on the question of what legal 
and social recognition should be given to same-sex relationships, the 
debates are raising deeper issues about the nature of marriage and the 
roles of law and religion in society. Although Canada and the United 
States share a common cultural and legal heritage, and there are many 
similarities and common influences in law, culture, economics, and 
politics, there are also significant differences. In both countries 
constitutional litigation and legislative reforms have resulted in 
significantly increased recognition of same-sex relationships, but the 
process of recognition began earlier in Canada and has now progressed 
further. 
This paper compares the controversies over the definition of 
marriage and the evolution in the recognition of same-sex relationships 
in Canada and the United States over the past few decades. The paper 
includes a consideration of the influences that developments in each of 
these countries has on the other, as these are issues for which advocates, 
courts, and legislatures have been giving considerable attention to cross-
border developments. I will not, however, consider the complex issues 
that American courts will have to address about the recognition of same-
sex marriages entered into in Canada.2
 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE 
PRESENT DEBATES 
 
While some today are arguing that religion should have no place in 
the current debate about the legal definition of marriage,3 religion 
historically established the legal basis of marriage throughout much of 
the world. In Canada and the United States, marriage law was largely 
based on Christian doctrine about marriage, in particular as reflected in 
the English common law.4
 2. A significant legal issue is what legal recognition will be given to American same-sex 
partners who come to Canada to marry. Media reports suggest that as many as one-third of all same-
sex marriages in Canada have involved American couples, though there is significant doubt as to 
whether these marriages will have legal recognition in their home states. See, e.g., Tim Naumetz, 
Canada a Mecca for “Quickie Gay Marriages,” NAT’L POST, May 13, 2005, at A5. 
 3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Thompson & Anne Dawson, Church Told to Butt Out: Same-Sex 
Debate No Place for Religion: Pettigrew, NAT’L POST, Jan. 28, 2005, at A1. 
 4. There is, of course, some variation within Christian faiths in terms of marriage doctrine, 
which was to some extent reflected in variations in marriage law between jurisdictions in North 
America. For example, some jurisdictions, such as Quebec and Louisiana, had strong Catholic 
traditions and influences, and a civilian legal heritage. There were also Aboriginal marital traditions 
and rules that were very different from the Christian ideas of marriage. This paper will focus on a 
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The Old Testament of the Bible accepts a view of marriage that 
included both polygamy and monogamy. The New Testament of the 
Bible recognizes the special nature of marriage and the importance of 
marital love. Polygamy is not condemned in the New Testament, but by 
the time of the Reformation in the 16th century, major Christian faiths in 
Europe had come to accept that marriage was to be monogamous.5 When 
the Mormon faith was founded in the early 19th century, it was premised 
on a polygamous view of marriage, though in the latter half of the 19th 
century, laws were enacted in North America to criminalize polygamy, 
and in 1890 the Mormon Church adopted a monogamous view of 
marriage. It is, however, estimated that there may be as many as 150,000 
Fundamentalist Mormons in North America who continue to practice 
polygamy.6 While the practice of polygamy is technically illegal, since 
1953 prosecutions have been very rare, and have generally only been 
against men who have gone through a form of polygamous marriage with 
an underage girl.7
discussion of the dominant legal heritage in North America, which came from England. 
 5. The polygamists in the Old Testament include Abraham, Jacob, David and Solomon. By 
420 A.D. Saint Augustine condemned polygamy in The Good of Marriage (ch. 15, para. 17). 
However polygamy continued to be practiced in medieval Christian Europe, and in 1563, the Roman 
Catholic Council of Trent felt it necessary to proclaim: “If anyone says that it is lawful for Christians 
to have several wives at the same time, and that it is not forbidden by any divine law, let him be 
anathema.” 
 6. See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-modern Polygamy: Considering 
Polyamory, 31 CAP. L. REV. 439 (2003). There are also reports of Muslim polygamous families in 
North America, but they appear to be relatively few in number. They are generally immigrants from 
countries where polygamy is legal, although legal migration to Canada and the United States by 
members of known polygamous families is generally not permitted. See Dena Hassouneh-Phillips, 
Polygamy and Wife Abuse: A Qualitative Study of Muslim Women in America, 22 HEALTH CARE 
FOR WOMEN INT’L 735 (2001); see also Chris Cobb & Bob Harvey, Canadian Muslim Leader 
Defends Polygamy: Children Treated Equally, NAT’L POST, Jan. 21, 2005. There are also Christian, 
Jewish and secular polygamist marriages in North America. See www.polygamy.com (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2005). 
 7. A discussion of polygamy is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that 
recognition of same-sex marriage raises very different issues from recognition of polygamy, from 
both constitutional and social policy perspectives. While the arguments in favor of same-sex 
marriage are largely based on a claim for equal treatment, polygamous relationships are inherently 
unequal. There is a growing body of research from both North America and societies where 
polygamy is widely practiced which finds that there is a greater prevalence of low self-esteem 
among women living in polygamous relationships than among women in monogamous marriages. 
Women in these relationships are in an inherently vulnerable and unequal position in social and 
economic terms, and are more likely to be victims of domestic violence. There are also studies which 
have found that in comparison to children from monogamous families, children from polygamous 
families have lower self-esteem, higher levels of self-reported family dysfunction, and lower levels 
of socio-economic status and academic achievement. See Nicholas Bala, et al., An International 
Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications for Canada, in POLYGAMY IN CANADA: LEGAL 
AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN – A COLLECTION OF POLICY RESEARCH 
REPORTS (2005), available at http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/0662420683/index_e.html. 
Even after the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), held the Constitution 
prevents the criminalizing of homosexual acts, the Federal Court in Utah has upheld the 
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In both Canada and the United States the laws and expectations for 
husbands and wives within marriage have changed dramatically over the 
past half century, setting the stage for the possible redefinition of 
marriage to include same-sex partners.8 The English common law of 
marriage, upon which laws in most jurisdictions in Canada and the 
United States were originally founded, had an explicitly Christian basis, 
and until the middle of the 19th century, legal jurisdiction over much of 
what today is called “family law” rested in the Ecclesiastical courts, not 
the King’s Courts.9 In the traditional legal view of marriage, the husband 
and wife had very different legal status.10 The English common law 
accorded the husband and wife distinctive roles, rights and obligations. 
The leading 18th century English legal scholar, William Blackstone, 
expounded on the legal nature of marriage: “By marriage, the husband 
and wife are one person in law; that is the very being or legal existence 
of the woman is . . . consolidated into that of the husband.”11 At common 
law, a woman who married lost her legal personality, as only her 
husband could contract or own property. 
Historically, from social, economic, and religious perspectives, the 
procreation of children was viewed as a central purpose of marriage, as 
was reflected in the common law concept of consummation.12 Based on 
canon law principles, at common law the inability to consummate a 
marriage (engage in opposite-sex intercourse) rendered a marriage 
voidable. While the jurisprudence discussed the importance of 
constitutional validity of the state’s law prohibiting polygamy. Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. Supp. 2d 
1329 (D. Utah 2005). The federal court rejected a challenge by polygamists that these provisions 
violate the right to free exercise of their religious beliefs under the First Amendment and right to 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution. The plaintiffs argued that 
their religion, Fundamentalist Mormonism, requires the practice of polygamy, and they brought the 
action after one of them was denied a marriage license on the grounds that he was already married. 
In Bronson, Judge Stewart referred to the Lawrence v. Texas decision, and concluded that, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court had carefully delineated the limitations of its ruling, Lawrence cannot be used 
to require Utah to recognize polygamous marriages as legally valid. Id. at 1333-34. 
 8. For a further discussion, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for 
Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2005). See also 
Linda C. McClain, “God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the Federal Marriage 
Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 313, at 329 (2006) (in this issue) (discussing in Section III.B. how 
the legal and social changes about family roles and responsibilities are in conflict with laws 
prohibiting, or at least failing to recognize, same-sex marriages). 
 9. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Unavoidable Influence of Religion Upon the Law of 
Marriage, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493, 494 (2004).
 10. Scott Greent, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and 
Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of 
the Marriage Relationship and Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 76-79 (1979). 
 11. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 430 (bk. 1, ch.15) 
(1765), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk1ch15.htm (last visited Aug. 
15, 2005). 
 12. See, e.g., Mills v. Mills, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 344 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1946). 
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procreation to marriage, the common law defined the consummation of 
marriage in terms of the “apparent ability to conceive.”13 The ability to 
engage in sexual intercourse was an essential element of marriage.14
Though of course children were born out of wedlock, the English 
common law enforced a strong link between marriage and childbearing; 
children born out of wedlock were referred to as “illegitimate,” that is 
outside of the law, and at common law their fathers had no rights or 
obligations towards them. The courts regarded women who lived with 
men outside of marriage as living in a relationship akin to prostitution, 
and these women had no claims against their partners at the end of a 
relationship. 
Until the latter part of the 20th century, the laws in both Canada and 
the United States clearly and explicitly reinforced moral expectations and 
gender roles within marriage. At common law, the legal presumption that 
the husband was the “head of the household” was so strong that a 
married woman could not even contract or own property. This common 
law rule was changed by legislation in the latter part of the 19th century, 
when married women gained the right to own property and contract. 
In the 1866 English case of Hyde v. Hyde, Lord Penzance articulated 
a definition of marriage that is still quoted15 in the current debates over 
the definition of marriage: “Marriage, as understood in Christendom, 
may . . . be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others.”16 The judge assumed that 
Christian religious ideals were to be the basis of the law of England. It is 
interesting to observe that this definition was actually made in the 
context of a decision about the non-recognition of potentially 
polygamous marriages, though the decision is cited today as establishing 
the centrality of opposite-sex partners for marriage. 
 13. See, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306. The focus on the apparent ability to 
conceive as opposed to the actual ability to conceive was at least in part because until recently the 
state of medical knowledge was such that it was generally not known why a couple who were 
engaging in sexual relations were unable to have a child, and whether they might still have a child 
despite a long period without conception. Further, it would have been very unfair, especially to 
women, if the actual inability to conceive would have been grounds for annulment or termination of 
a marriage. 
 14. Historically, adultery was defined as requiring heterosexual sexual intercourse. In 2005, 
after Canada adopted same-sex marriage, the British Columbia Supreme Court redefined adultery to 
include intimate sexual contact with the genitals of a same-sex partner. See S.E.P. v.D.D.P. (2005), 
259 D.L.R.(4th) 358 (B.C.S.C.); see also John C. Eastman, Full Faith and Republican Guarantees: 
Gay Marriage, FMPA, and the Courts, 20 BYU J. PUB. L 243, at 253 (2006) (in this issue) 
(predicting difficulties in drafting and interpretting states’ adultery statutes due to the current and 
potential future changes in the same-sex marriage arena). 
 15. See, e.g., Editorial, Religion and Marriage, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 3, 2005, at A20; 
see also EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] 95 B.C.L.R.3d 122, rev’d, 
[2003] 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1. 
 16. Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, at 133. 
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Based on principles of canon law, the English common law viewed 
marriage as indissoluble (though the very wealthy could seek a 
Parliamentary divorce). It is notable that a few years before Hyde was 
decided in 1866, legislation had been enacted in England to provide for 
judicial divorce. In 1857, after intense debate, the English Parliament 
enacted the Matrimonial Causes Act,17 transferring jurisdiction for family 
law issues from the Ecclesiastical to the secular courts, and allowing for 
judicial divorce. As in today’s debates over same-sex marriage, the 
debate in 1857 over whether to allow for the judicial dissolution of 
marriage engaged religious leaders as well as politicians. 
The dates for the introduction of divorce in different jurisdictions in 
North America varied greatly, with some of the American colonies 
allowing for judicial divorce even before the Revolution. Judicial divorce 
generally came to Canada later, and some Canadian provinces did not 
have judicial divorce until 1968.18 Until the last part of the 20th century, 
divorce was relatively rare in North America, and generally only an 
“innocent party” could obtain a divorce, most commonly based on the 
adultery or other “marital fault” of the “guilty party.” 
One of the most significant developments of the past half century in 
the laws governing marriage has been the rise of “no fault” divorce. 
Starting with California in 1969, jurisdictions throughout North America 
experienced the “divorce revolution,”19 adopting laws that permitted 
divorce on a “no fault” basis, either instead of, or more commonly in 
addition to, fault grounds.20 The introduction of “no fault” divorce was 
intended to reduce the animosity surrounding the divorce process, and to 
facilitate the resolution of issues arising from divorce, especially those 
related to children.21 The divorce rate has risen sharply across North 
America, roughly corresponding with the introduction of no-fault divorce 
laws, and it has been argued that these legal reforms have caused, or at 
least contributed to, the increase in the rate of family breakdown. While 
adopting no-fault regimes facilitated the process of obtaining a divorce, 
there is real controversy about whether the adoption of a no-fault regime 
had any long term effects on rates of divorce and family breakdown. At 
 17. Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. For a discussion of the 
controversy over the 1857 English reforms, see e.g., LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE : 
ENGLAND 1530–1987 (1990), and RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER : A HISTORY OF 
DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY (1988). 
 18. For a history of Canadian divorce law, see D.C. MCKIE ET AL., DIVORCE: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN CANADA 24–38 (Statistics Canada 1983). 
 19. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985). 
 20. See, e.g., SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 78–86 (2003). 
 21. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 160–162 (1998) 
(prefatory note). 
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worst, the adoption of a no-fault regime is weakly correlated with 
increases in long term divorce rates. Most if not all of the increase in 
divorce rates in North America is attributable to a complex interaction of 
social, cultural and economic factors. Perhaps the most important factor 
in the rise in the divorce rate is that families are having fewer children 
and women have much higher rates of employment than in the past, 
making women more willing to leave unhappy or abusive marriages.22 
While there are significant variations between jurisdictions in North 
America in divorce rates, these are a result of social, economic and 
cultural factors rather than differences in legal regimes.23 Whatever the 
causes of the increase in the divorce rate, from a legal perspective, 
marriage is no longer viewed as indissoluble, and from a social 
perspective, divorce is now a common feature of North American family 
life. What is clear is that marriage in North America has changed 
dramatically, and those who get married have much less certainty that 
they will stay together until “death us do part.” However, divorce rates in 
the first decade of the millennium seem to be stabilizing and perhaps 
even declining, with about one marriage in two in the United States 
ending in divorce, and one marriage in three in Canada resulting in a 
divorce.24
Until the latter part of the 20th century, family law legislation 
everywhere was generally written in explicitly gendered terms. The law 
expected the husband to be employed, while the wife was regarded as a 
dependent caring for the home and children. Only a wife was eligible to 
seek spousal support at the end of a marriage, but she would generally 
forfeit this right if she committed adultery, thereby breaching one of the 
fundamental expectations of marriage. Throughout much of the 20th 
century, there was a strong presumption that after separation, children 
would be placed in the care of their mothers, unless the mother had 
violated the expectations for marriage by committing adultery. 
 
 22. For a discussion of factors affecting divorce rates and a good review of the controversy 
over the effects of no fault divorce laws on divorce rates, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM 
CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 153–158 (2000). 
 23. All jurisdictions in Canada have the same divorce law, but the divorce rate varies from 
twenty-two per 100 marriages in Newfoundland to fourty-two per 100 marriages in Alberta. See 
STATISTICS CANADA, Divorces, THE DAILY, Mar. 9, 2005, at 2–3, available at http://www.statcan.ca 
/Daily/English/050309/d050309b.htm. 
 24. There is a degree of controversy and complexity about calculating the proportion of 
marriages that will end in divorce, though it is clear that Canada has a significantly lower divorce 
rate than the United States. For divorce rates in Canada, see http://www.statcan.ca/Daily 
/English/050309/d050309b.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). For a discussion of U.S. divorce rates, 
see http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). For one international 
comparison of divorce rates, see http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/peo_div_rat (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2005). 
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The laws of Canada and the United States have changed dramatically 
over the past fifty years, and marriage is now regarded as a “partnership 
of equals,” with a presumption in most jurisdictions that marital property 
will generally be shared, regardless of whose direct efforts resulted in the 
acquisition of specific assets. Laws no longer refer to “husbands” and 
“wives,” but are generally written in gender neutral terms, with, in 
theory, either partner being able to seek spousal support, though both 
spouses are also expected to take reasonable measures to be self-
supporting after separation. Fathers and mothers are, in statutes, 
presumed to be equally capable of caring for their children. Unlike 
earlier family laws which had rigid expectations and in most jurisdictions 
refused to enforce marriage contracts, today, when marrying, spouses 
have significant autonomy to define their rights and obligations upon 
termination of their relationship. Spouses are viewed as legally equal. 
Gender roles in marriage are no longer legally prescribed. 
Further, the link between the traditional marriage and parenthood has 
become attenuated. With improvements in birth control, the number of 
children per marriage has fallen dramatically over the past century in 
North America, and with rising infertility and changes in life choices 
being made by married women, a growing number of married couples 
are without children. There is also a growing social acceptance of single 
parenthood, and fewer children in North America are being raised in two 
parent families.25 In Canada, all legal distinctions between children born 
in wedlock and out of wedlock (the formerly “illegitimate”) have been 
abolished, and in the United States these legal distinctions have largely 
disappeared. Further, with the development of artificial reproductive 
technology, same-sex couples are able to raise, from birth, children to 
whom one of the parents is biologically related. The view that marriage 
is inextricably intertwined with procreation no longer reflects social or 
legal reality. 
With all of these changes in the nature of “traditional” marriage the 
virtual abolition of the concept of illegitimacy, the discarding of legally 
proscribed gender roles in marriage, and the advent of “no fault” 
divorce—it is understandable that the question of the legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships is arising now. It is more difficult to argue that 
marriage law should require two spouses of opposite gender if there are, 
 25. For a description of some of the salient changes in family life in Canada over the past 
half century, including statistics on the decline in the number of children in two parent families, and 
the increase in the labor force participation of married women, see Kerry Daly, Reframed Family 
Portraits, TRANSITION MAG., Spring 2005, at 3–11, available at http://www.vifamily.ca/library 
/transition/351/351.html. For data and descriptions from a number of jurisdictions, including the 
United States, see THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILIES (Jacqueline Scott 
et al., eds. 2004). 
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in fact, no longer legally specified gender roles. At least for some 
married couples, there is growing ambiguity about their social and 
economic expectations for the roles of “husband” and “wife.” While 
many married couples continue to follow at least some traditional gender 
roles in terms of domestic responsibilities and employment, this is a 
matter of choice, not legal policy. It is not coincidental that those who 
oppose same-sex marriage and favor upholding the traditional legal 
definition of marriage are social conservatives, who also tend to support 
relatively traditional social and economic roles for husbands and wives 
within marriage.26
While there is generally only one legally operative definition of 
marriage within a jurisdiction at any time, different people in a 
jurisdiction may have very different social, spiritual, economic, and 
sexual expectations of marital relationship. Throughout North America, 
different married couples within the same jurisdiction have very different 
views about the appropriate roles within marriage. Some couples view 
marriage as a “partnership of equals,” with no role differentiation in 
terms of child care, household duties or labor force participation, while 
others may hold traditional patriarchal expectations for husband and 
wife, with the husband clearly the “head of the household,” and the wife 
having the role of home-maker. 
 
III.  SETTING THE CONTEXT: NON-TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN 
CANADA & THE UNITED STATES 
 
Before discussing the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in 
Canada and the United States, it is valuable to consider how the laws in 
these two countries deal with other familial relationships that are formed 
outside of the traditional marital relationship. Canada has developed a 
relatively broad approach to the recognition of familial relationships that 
are based on neither marriage nor biological links, with particular regard 
towards opposite-sex adults in conjugal relationships, and parent-like 
relationships between adults and children who do not have a biological 
link. 
Historically in Canada, as in the United States, there was great social 
opprobrium attached to adults who were “living in sin”—cohabiting 
without being married—and there was no legal recognition given to this 
type of relationship. Changing social mores in the 1960s and 1970s led to 
wider social acceptance of opposite-sex cohabitation outside of marriage 
 26. See Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11 
(2004); Appleton, supra note 8. 
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and an increase in the incidence of what is often referred to in Canada as 
“common-law marriage.”27 By 2001, 14% of all Canadian opposite-sex 
couples residing together were unmarried, an increase from 6% in 
1981.28
In 1972, British Columbia became the first province to recognize 
opposite-sex cohabitation for purposes of spousal support, extending the 
statutory definition of “spouse” for this purpose to include a person of 
the opposite sex if they “lived together as husband and wife” for at least 
two years.29 Over the next twenty years almost every province enacted 
legislation giving limited recognition to unmarried opposite-sex partners 
for a range of legal purposes such as spousal support, dependent’s relief, 
and survivor’s tort claims. 
In a series of decisions starting in 1980,30 the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that property claims between unmarried partners could be 
made based on constructive trust doctrine, with the proportion of 
entitlement determined according to the amount of the contribution to the 
acquisition or maintenance of property. In 1993, the Supreme Court held 
that in long term relationships, contributions to household management 
and child care can be the basis of a claim of unjust enrichment,31 and the 
remedy to recognize this claim could include a claim by one partner to a 
division of property owned by the other partner before the relationship 
commenced. The Court ruled that there is no duty for a common-law 
partner to provide domestic services, and therefore, there should be some 
form of compensation when the relationship ends. 
In its 1995 decision Miron v. Trudel,32 the Supreme Court held that 
for some legal purposes, legislatures are obliged under the Equality 
Rights provision of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms to give long term opposite-sex common law partners the same 
rights as legally married persons. In Miron, the Court held that for the 
purposes of claiming benefits under an insurance policy, a long term 
unmarried partner was to be treated as a “spouse,” with the same rights 
 27. In Canada, the term “common-law marriage” is often used to describe an opposite-sex 
conjugal relationship where the parties cohabit but are not legally married. The term “common law 
marriage” has a different meaning in the United States, where in twelve states parties can effect a 
legal marriage “at common-law” without following the statutorily required ceremonial and 
registration requirements for marriage by cohabiting and “holding themselves out as husband and 
wife[.]” See Katz, supra note 18, at 23–26. 
 28. STATISTICS CANADA, PROFILE OF CANADIAN FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS: 
DIVERSIFICATION CONTINUES at 3 (2002), available at http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01 
/products/analytic/companion/fam/pdf/96F0030XIE2001003.pdf, (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
 29. Family Relations Act, S.B.C. 1972, ch. 20, § 15(e)(iii). 
 30. Pettkus v. Backer, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. 
 31. Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980. 
 32. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 
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as a married partner. However, in its 2002 decision in Nova Scotia 
(Attorney General) v. Walsh,33 the Supreme Court ruled that since 
unmarried opposite-sex partners have “chosen” not to marry, it is not 
discriminatory to deny them rights as against each other under provincial 
marital property laws. As a result of these decisions and consequent 
legislative reforms, in most provinces unmarried partners are treated 
differently than their married counterparts. For example, unmarried 
partners are denied access to some of the statutory rights that married 
partners have in regard to the marital home. Additionally, they do not 
have the benefit of the statutory presumption of sharing the marital 
property, but rather must prove entitlement based on contribution using 
constructive trust or unjust enrichment doctrine.34
There is now some variation between provinces in the rights and 
obligations of common law opposite-sex couples, as well as variation 
within provinces in the operative legal definitions, but in a broad sense, 
unmarried opposite-sex relationships in Canada can be characterized as 
“marriage-lite.” After a period of cohabitation, unmarried partners have 
an imposed or ascribed status that has many, but not all, of the legal 
attributes of marriage. With the exception of those living in Quebec, 
those who live together in a conjugal relationship without marrying, after 
a period of cohabitation, acquire the rights and obligations, for most legal 
purposes, of those who choose to marry.35 The period of cohabitation 
varies with the jurisdiction and purpose, from any period to as long as 
five years. In Quebec, with its civilian traditions, rights and obligation 
generally arise only if partners have registered their relationship, or if 
there has been some contribution to the acquisition of assets. However, 
 33.  [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325. 
 34. In Manitoba and Saskatchewan legislation was enacted to give long term cohabitants the 
same rights in regard to marital property as the married: Manitoba, three years cohabitation, applies 
to same and opposite-sex partners; The Common-Law Partners’ Property and Related Amendments 
Act, S.M. 2002, ch. 48, § 16; Saskatchewan three years cohabitation; The Matrimonial Property Act, 
1997, § 2(1), as enacted by The Miscellaneous Statutes (Domestic Relations) Amendment Act, 2001 
(No. 2), S.S. 2001, ch. 51, § 8(5). This legislative action in Manitoba and Saskatchewan was partly 
prompted by litigation between unmarried opposite-sex partners and same-sex partners elsewhere in 
Canada. 
 35. Conjugality—living together in a spousal relationship—is not defined in exclusively 
sexual terms, though a sexual relationship is almost always an important element of conjugality. 
Conjugality is established by a combination of the sharing of economic, social and emotional lives. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the characteristics of a “conjugal” relationship include 
“shared shelter, sexual and personal behavior, services, social activities, economic support and 
children, as well as the societal perception of the couple.” A couple does not necessarily have to 
satisfy all of these elements to be living in a conjugal relationship. M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. It is 
now accepted in Canada that same-sex partners can live in a “conjugal” relationship. See Ross v. 
Reaney, [2003] O.J. No. 2366 for a case where the court discussed the meaning of “conjugal” in a 
homosexual relationship and awarded interim spousal support at the end a conjugal same-sex 
relationship. 
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even in Quebec, for such federal purposes as income tax, “spousal 
status” arises after one year’s cohabitation—even without registration. 
Non-marital couples are increasingly making cohabitation agreements to 
regulate their affairs, and these contracts have statutory recognition in all 
Canadian jurisdictions, though their use is still not widespread. 
This legal recognition of unmarried opposite-sex relationships in 
Canada offers protection to those who live in these relationships and are 
most vulnerable (i.e., usually women and their children), but it also has 
the effect of reducing the burden that the state might otherwise have in 
providing support through social assistance. While non-marital opposite-
sex relationships often have many of the social, economic, and emotional 
characteristics of legal marriages, these relationships are characterized by 
higher rates of breakdown36 and domestic violence.37 Failing to provide 
legal recognition and protection to those who are vulnerable in these 
relationships, however, would do nothing to promote familial stability or 
address issues like the relatively high rates of abuse in non-marital 
relationships. Indeed, it is important to recognize these relationships, so 
that full legal protections can be afforded to those who live in them. It is 
significant to note that Quebec, which has the least legal recognition of 
non-marital opposite-sex relationships, also has by far the highest rate of 
cohabitation in Canada,38 suggesting that denial of recognition does not 
discourage this type of relationship. Lack of legal recognition simply 
leaves those who may be vulnerable with less legal protection. 
In the United States there is significant variation between states in 
the legal treatment of unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants, but in general 
there is significantly less legal recognition of these relationships than in 
Canada. While the 1976 California decision Marvin v. Marvin39 
recognized that, in theory, an unmarried partner can raise a property 
claim based on an express or implied contract in the absence of a written 
cohabitation agreement (which is rare), courts have generally been 
reluctant to find an agreement.40 In some states, like Illinois, the courts 
have refused to enforce agreements between non-marital partners.41 In a 
few states, the courts have given long-term, non-marital, opposite-sex 
 36. See, e.g., Zheng Wu, Cohabitation: An Alternative Form of Family Living (Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
 37. See, e.g., Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 2005 
(Ottawa 2005). 
 38. See STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 26. 
 39. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 40. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); and Morone v. 
Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980) (rejecting implied contract concept; only express agreements 
between cohabitants are enforceable in New York). 
 41. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). 
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partners property rights similar to marriage rights, and some states allow 
for these partners to enter registered domestic partnerships to gain some 
of the rights and obligations of marriage.42 No state, however, imposes 
rights and obligations upon the unmarried in the way that is common in 
Canada, leaving American women who cohabit outside of marriage with 
much less protection than is afforded to women in Canada who live in 
this type of familial relationship. 
The United States also has fewer couples living in non-marital 
relationships, with only 8% of opposite-sex couples living outside of 
marriage compared to 14% in Canada.43 The higher rate of marriage in 
the United States may provide a partial explanation for the higher 
divorce rate. In Canada, those who are likely to separate may be more 
likely to cohabit and separate, while in the United States they are more 
likely to marry, but also more likely to then divorce. 
Canadian law accepts that children may develop psychologically 
profound relationships with adult care-givers who come to stand in the 
place of parents, and the protection of the interests of children may 
require the recognition of these relationships. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has accepted that if persons other than biological parents become 
caregivers for a child, a dispute over the custody of the child should be 
resolved on the basis of the “best interests” of the child, without a legal 
presumption in favor of the biological parents.44 Legislation in Canada 
recognizes that those who have come to develop a parent-like 
relationship with a child should have the rights and obligations of a 
parent. For example, section 2(2) of the Divorce Act provides a 
definition of “child of the marriage,” which includes any child for whom 
one “stands in the place of a parent,” and imposes a child support 
obligation on these individuals, and gives them the right to seek custody 
or access in accordance with the best interests of the child. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has held that once a step-parent or other person has 
established a “parental relationship” with the child, the support 
obligation is established and it cannot be revoked.45 Until recently, these 
provisions were most commonly used to give rights and impose 
obligations on step-parents in marriages. They also give parental status to 
same-sex partners of biological parents, even after separation from the 
biological parent, provided that a meaningful parental role has been 
 42. See JOHN GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 22–31 (Lexis Nexis 2d ed. 
2001). 
 43. See Divorce Declining, but so is Marriage, USA TODAY, July 18, 2005. 
 44. See, e.g., King v. Low, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87. See also Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. 
M.(C.), [1994] 2 S.C.R.165. 
 45. Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242. 
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established during cohabitation.46
Traditionally, in the United States there has been little legal 
recognition given to those who have assumed a parent-like role for 
children, while a strong priority was given to the rights of biological 
parents. American law has tended to have strong presumption in favor of 
the claims of biological parents, with some cases indicating that the 
constitutional rights of biological parents can take precedence to having 
courts make decisions about children based on an assessment of the best 
interests of the child. 47 Historically, the main effect of this approach was 
to limit the rights and obligations of step-parents, and to allow biological 
parents who were not clearly unfit to regain custody of children from 
long time care-givers who had become “de facto” or “psychological 
parents.” 
The aforementioned approach has also resulted in the partners of 
lesbian biological parents having no rights or obligations in regard to 
children for whom they had a parental role. For example, in a 1991 
decision the California Court of Appeal denied any status to a lesbian 
whose partner conceived two children by artificial insemination during 
their relationship, even though the woman had a parental role for the 
children since birth. The court refused to assess whether it was in the 
interests of the children to have visitation with the woman after she 
separated from the biological parent, dismissing the claim without an 
adjudication on the merits.48 More recently, however, courts in a number 
of states, including California, have begun to use the “intended parent” 
concept to allow lesbian partners of biological mothers to have full 
parental rights and obligations. Both the child and society have a strong 
interest in recognizing the reality of these relationships, as the California 
Supreme Court acknowledged in its recent ruling in Elisa B. v. Emily B., 
 
[W]e perceive no reason why both parents of a child cannot be 
women . . . the Legislature implicitly recognized the value of having 
two parents, rather than one, as a source of both emotional and 
financial support, especially when the obligation to support the child 
would otherwise fall to the public. 49
 46. See, e.g., Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. No. 2646 (Gen. Div.). 
 47. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); see also GREGORY ET AL., supra note 
40, at 466–478. 
 48. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal Ct. App. 1991). 
 49. Elisa B. v. Emily B., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46 (Cal. 2005); see Adam Liptak, California Ruling 
Expands Same-Sex Parental Rights, N. Y. TIMES LATE EDITION, Aug. 23, 2005 at 10. Courts in 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have 
taken a similar approach to recognition of rights of lesbian partners of biological mothers. See 
http://www.glad.org/News_Room/press71-4-7-04.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 2005). 
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The approach of Canadian courts and legislatures to unmarried 
opposite-sex partners and relationships of children to psychological 
parents has recognized social, psychological and economic realities, 
protecting the interests of those who are dependent and vulnerable. The 
progress on these issues laid the ground work for a more flexible 
approach for the more recent recognition of same-sex relationships. It is 
easier for a society to begin to address issues with non-traditional 
families by focusing on such issues as promoting the welfare of children, 
remedying unjust enrichment and protecting those who are vulnerable. 
The recognition of same-sex relationships is likely to come only after 
less contentious issues. American laws have lagged behind those of 
Canada in terms of recognizing unmarried opposite-sex cohabitation and 
de facto parents, but it is significant that the laws about these issues are 
starting to change in the United States, especially as they relate to 
children. This may presage future changes in American laws related to 
same-sex relationships. 
 
IV.  RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN CANADA 
 
Throughout the world, and over much of human history, 
homosexuals were subjected to ridicule, harassment, discrimination and 
abuse, and in many countries, including Canada, they were subject to 
criminal prosecution. In the past half century, however, there have been 
dramatic changes in social and legal attitudes towards homosexuals in 
many countries, including Canada. 
Participation in homosexual acts, such as anal intercourse, was a 
crime in Canada until 1969, when Parliament amended the Criminal 
Code to abolish these offenses.50 In arguing for the decriminalization of 
consensual homosexual acts between adults, Pierre Trudeau, then the 
Justice Minister and later the Prime Minister, declared that “[t]he State 
has no place in the nation’s bedrooms.”51 Starting in 1977, provincial 
legislatures in Canada began to amend their human rights codes to add a 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, for such 
purposes as, for example, employment.52 After the introduction of the 
 50. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968–1969 S.C., ch. 38, § 7 (Can.) (abolished the offense 
of “sodomy,” so that it was no longer a crime for consenting adults to engage in anal intercourse in 
private). For a fuller discussion of this change in the criminal law, see DONALD G. CASSWELL, 
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND CANADIAN LAW 108–14 (1996). 
 51. See JOHN ROBERT COLOMBO, JOHN ROBERT COLOMBO’S FAMOUS LASTING WORDS: 
GREAT CANADIAN QUOTATIONS 424 (2000). 
 52. Quebec was the first province to enact such a law. An Act to Amend the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, S.Q. 1977, ch. 6. Alberta, Canada’s most conservative province, still 
  
210 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, most politicians and 
members of the Canadian public were prepared to accept that it was 
wrong to overtly discriminate against individuals on the basis of their 
sexual orientation in regard to such issues as employment. By the late 
1980s, there was growing social acceptance of homosexuality, which 
resulted in more gay and lesbian partners openly cohabiting, especially in 
urban areas. The demand for legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
increased, and Canadian courts started to give limited recognition to 
these relationships for family law purposes. In 1986, for example, a 
British Columbia court held that a same-sex partner could use the 
constructive trust doctrine in the same way as an opposite-sex unmarried 
partner to make a claim to property acquired during a domestic 
relationship.53
Despite a growing consensus that overt discrimination against gays 
and lesbians would not be tolerated in Canadian society, homosexuals 
continued to face prejudice, as well as acts of violence perpetrated 
against them because of their sexual orientation. In the early 1990s, 
politicians and judges were still unwilling to accord familial rights or 
spousal status to same-sex partners. In 1993, an Ontario court dismissed 
a Charter challenge by a same-sex couple who argued that their 
constitutional rights had been violated when they were refused a 
marriage license.54 The court ruled that since the common law definition 
of “marriage” was a union of “one man and one woman,” it was not 
discriminatory to preclude same-sex partners from marrying each other. 
One of the “principal purposes of the institution of marriage,” the court 
observed, was the procreation of children, which cannot be “achieved in 
a homosexual union,” concluding, “this reality that is recognized in the 
limitation of marriage to persons of the opposite sex.”55
In the mid 1990s, judicial attitudes began to change, though initially 
not in cases claiming full “marital” rights. In one 1997 Ontario case, for 
example, the court accepted that under provincial child support laws, 
which had been enacted to impose support obligations on step-parents, 
the lesbian partner of a child’s biological mother could have “parental” 
support rights and obligations as she had “demonstrated a settled 
intention” to treat the child as part of her family.56
has not added sexual orientation as a prohibited ground, though the Supreme Court of Canada has 
“read in” this term to that province’s human rights code. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R 493. 
 53. Anderson v. Luoma, [1986], 50 R.F.L.2d 127 (B.C.S.C.). 
 54. Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations), [1993] 14 O.R.3d 
658. 
 55. Id. at 666. 
 56. Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. 2646. 
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While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not 
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
section 15 of the Charter does provide that “[e]very individual is equal 
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination.” Section 15 enumerates 
certain prohibited grounds of discrimination, such race, religion, sex, age 
and mental or physical disability. In its 1995 decision in Egan v. 
Canada,57 the Supreme Court of Canada considered a constitutionally 
based claim by long-term same-sex partners to “spousal” benefits under 
the old age pension legislation, which provided benefits to both long 
term opposite-sex cohabitants and married “spouses.” Although a 
majority of the Court did not accept that particular claim, the entire Court 
agreed that “[s]exual orientation is a deeply personal characteristic that is 
either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal 
costs,”58 and that accordingly “sexual orientation” should be treated as 
“analogous” to the “enumerated” prohibited grounds in section 15. Since 
Egan, sexual orientation has been accepted as a prohibited ground for 
discrimination under the Charter. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial family 
law legislation which permits partners in long-term opposite-sex 
relationships to seek “spousal” support at the end of their relationship 
violated section 15 of the Charter, discriminating against homosexuals by 
not affording them “spousal” status. Justice Cory, writing for a majority 
of the Court in M. v. H.,59 emphasized the social importance of 
recognizing same-sex relationships: 
 
The exclusion of same-sex partners from the benefits of [spousal 
support law] . . . promotes the view that . . . individuals in same-sex 
relationships . . . are less worthy of recognition and protection. It 
implies that they are judged to be incapable of forming intimate 
relationships of economic interdependence as compared to opposite-sex 
couples, without regard to their actual circumstances. 
 . . . [T]he human dignity of individuals in same-sex relationships is 
violated by the impugned legislation.60
 
In M. v. H., the Supreme Court was careful to observe that it was 
only ruling that it was discriminatory to deny same-sex conjugal partners 
the rights enjoyed by unmarried opposite-sex conjugal partners, and the 
 57. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
 58.  Id. at 514 (La Forest, J., writing for the full Court on this issue). 
 59. M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
 60. Id. at paras. 73–74 (emphasis added). 
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Court was not directly comparing same-sex partners to married opposite-
sex couples. However, the Court’s analysis and rhetoric clearly 
suggested that the Court would be sympathetic to a future argument that 
the failure to allow same-sex partners to marry is an affront to their 
“human dignity.” The Court recognized in M. v. H. that “there is 
evidence to suggest that same-sex relationships are not typically 
characterized by the same economic and other inequalities which affect 
opposite-sex relationships,”61 and thus these relationships will less 
frequently result in economic dependency and claims to spousal support. 
Nevertheless, the Court said: 
 
[S]ame-sex couples will often form long, lasting, loving and intimate 
relationships.  
. . . While it is true that there may not be any consensus as to the 
societal perception of same-sex couples, there is agreement that 
same-sex couples share many . . . ”conjugal” characteristics. In order to 
come within the definition, neither opposite-sex couples nor same-sex 
couples are required to fit precisely the traditional marital model to 
demonstrate that the relationship is “conjugal.”62
 
In response to M. v. H., the federal and provincial governments 
enacted legislation to give same-sex partners the same legal recognition 
as opposite-sex non-marital partners, based on a period of “conjugal 
cohabitation”63 (e.g., generally one to three years depending on the 
jurisdiction). Nova Scotia, Manitoba, and Quebec went further by also 
enacting a registered domestic partnership law,64 allowing unmarried 
conjugal partners, whether of the same or opposite-sex, to register and 
thereby gain some significant rights and obligations of married spouses, 
to the extent permitted by provincial law (i.e., for such purposes as 
marital property, support, and succession). 
Canada has a complex division of jurisdiction over family law and 
marriage. Under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal 
Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over “marriage and divorce,” but 
under section 92(12) the “solemnization of marriage” is a matter of 
 61. Id. at para. 110 (per Iacobucci, J.). 
 62. Id. at paras. 58–59, (per Cory, J.). 
 63. See, e.g., Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 12 (Can.).
 64. See Bill 75, An Act to Comply with Certain Court Decisions and to Modernize and 
Reform Laws in the Province, 1st Sess., 58th Leg., N. S., 2000 (3d Reading, 30 Nov. 2000). See The 
Common-Law Partners’ Property and Related Amendments Act, 2002 S.M., ch. 48, § 23 (creating a 
registration scheme under the Vital Statistics Act); An Act Instituting Civil Unions and Establishing 
New Rules of Filiation, 2002 S.Q., ch. 6. For a fuller discussion of registered domestic partnerships 
in Canada, see Nicole LaViolette, Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Partnerships as an 
Option for Relationship Recognition Reform in Canada, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 115 (2002). 
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provincial and territorial jurisdiction. The federal Parliament has 
jurisdiction over the law of capacity to marry, which includes the basic 
definition of “marriage,” and the issue of whether same-sex partners can 
marry. For most of its history, Canada relied on the common law to 
define capacity to marry, including such issues as the law of physical 
capacity to consummate the marriage. The legal definition of marriage in 
Canada was long based of the 1866 English case of Hyde v. Hyde, that 
marriage is “the voluntary union . . . of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others.”65
After M. v. H., gays and lesbian seeking to marry began Charter-
based challenges to this traditional legal definition, claiming that it 
discriminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation. In a 
number of decisions starting in 2002, lower courts in most jurisdictions 
in Canada recognized that it is a violation of the Charter to deny same-
sex partners the right to marry. By early 2005, courts in eight provinces 
and two territories had issued such rulings. While each of these decisions 
applied the federal law governing marital capacity, each decision was 
only binding in the province or territory of the court that gave it. The first 
cases were thoroughly litigated, with the federal and provincial 
governments defending the traditional definition of marriage, but after 
the 2003 Ontario Court of Appeal judgment in Halpern v. Canada 
(Attorney General),66 the federal government announced that it would 
not appeal that decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the later 
cases were quickly resolved. There were no applications made to the 
courts in the remaining two provinces, Alberta and Prince Edward 
Island; which, perhaps not coincidentally, are among the most socially 
conservative in Canada. Same-sex marriage in those two jurisdictions 
awaited federal legislation. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Halpern is the most 
frequently cited judgment in Canada on the constitutional right of same-
sex partners to marry. On the importance of giving same-sex partners the 
right to marry, the Court of Appeal wrote: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65. Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, at 133. 
 66. Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161. The highest appeal court 
in each Canadian province is called the Court of Appeal. 
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Marriage is . . . one of the most significant forms of personal 
relationships. For centuries, marriage has been a basic element of social 
organization in societies around the world. Through the institution of 
marriage, individuals can publicly express their love and commitment 
to each other. . . . This public recognition and sanction of marital 
relationships reflect society’s approbation of the personal hopes, desires 
and aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal relationships. 
This can only enhance an individual’s sense of self-worth and dignity.67
 
The Court of Appeal emphasized the importance of the “choice” that 
opposite-sex partners have when deciding whether to get married or only 
have the more limited rights and obligations which the law in Canada 
affords unmarried cohabitants based on a period of cohabitation. The 
Court of Appeal observed: 
 
[M]arried couples have instant access to all benefits and obligations. 
. . . Same-sex couples are denied access because they are prohibited 
from marrying[.] 
. . . [S]ame-sex couples are excluded from a fundamental societal 
institution—marriage. The societal significance of marriage, and the 
corresponding benefits that are available only to married persons, 
cannot be overlooked. . . . Exclusion perpetuates the view that same-sex 
relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex 
relationships. In doing so, it offends the dignity of persons in same-sex 
relationships.68
 
In the course of these decisions, the courts had to consider what has 
been the strongest secular concern about same-sex marriage: that it may 
endanger the family and society. One commentator, for example, argued 
that there is “danger in taking the country down the path marked out by 
the Court . . . [which] would undermine . . . an institution so essential to 
the well-being of Canadians.”69 In rejecting this type of argument in 
Halpern, the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote: 
 
 
 67. Id. at para. 5. The decision was a unanimous ruling by McMurtry C.J.O., MacPherson 
and Gillese JJ.A. 
 68.  Id. at paras. 104–107. 
 69. Douglas Allen et al., Don’t Kiss Off Marriage, THE GLOBE & MAIL (June 18, 2003). This 
statement was signed by a number of Canadian religious leaders, academics and lawyers. For a fuller 
critique of Canada’s recognition of same-sex marriage, see DANIEL CERE & DOUGLAS FARROW, 
DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 
(McGill-Queen’s Press 2004); and Stewart supra note 24. For a Canadian advocacy group that 
defends the traditional definition of marriage, see www.defendmarriage.ca (last visited Aug. 20, 
2005). 
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We fail to see how the encouragement of procreation and childrearing 
is a pressing and substantial objective of maintaining marriage as an 
exclusively heterosexual institution. Heterosexual married couples will 
not stop having or raising children because same-sex couples are 
permitted to marry. Moreover, an increasing percentage of children are 
being born to and raised by same-sex couples.70
 
 
While the widespread legal and social recognition given to opposite-
sex cohabitants in Canada may have contributed to the fall in the 
marriage rate, recognizing same-sex unions will not be likely to deter any 
heterosexual person from marrying or having children. Further, as 
acknowledged in Halpern, it is becoming more common for same-sex 
couples in Canada to have the care of children, conceived to one partner 
by artificial insemination, adopted by the couple, or born to one partner 
prior to entering the same-sex relationship; recognizing the relationship 
of these same-sex partners will promote the welfare of these children. 
There is now a substantial body of social science literature 
concerning the impact on children of being raised by two homosexual 
partners (usually lesbians) as custodial parents. While there would 
undoubtedly be value in doing more research into parenting by 
homosexuals, especially by gay fathers who have not been the subject of 
much study, the existing research serves to alleviate fears that children 
who are raised by same-sex partners are worse off than children raised by 
opposite-sex parents. The existing studies reveal no significant 
differences between children raised by same-sex couples and opposite-
sex couples in emotional or cognitive developmental outcomes or in 
terms of mental health.71 As early as the mid-1970s, Canadian courts 
began to accept that lesbian mothers could be awarded custody after 
separation from heterosexual fathers. In 1976, one Canadian judge 
remarked that “the manner in which one fulfills one’s sexual needs does 
not relate to the abilities of being a good parent.”72
 70. Halpern, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161 at para. 123. 
 71. For a detailed study of spousal behavior and parenting by homosexuals in Canada, see 
ANNE-MARIE AMBERTO, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND SAME-SEX PARENT FAMILIES: RELATIONSHIPS, 
PARENTING, AND ISSUES OF MARRIAGE (2005), available at http://www.vifamily.ca/library 
/publications/ samesexd.html (last visited, Aug. 20, 2005). See also Judith Stacey & Timothy J. 
Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter? 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159 (Apr. 1, 
2001), available at 2001 WLNR 208746 (last visited, Jan. 28, 2006); Stephen A. Newman, The Use 
and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 537 (2004). 
While there have been some relatively small differences in terms of sexual orientation of children 
raised in gay and lesbian households, there are likely genetic explanations for these differences. 
 72. K. v. K., [1976] 2 W.W.R. 462 at 465 (Alta. Prov. Ct.). See also Bubis v. Jones, [2000] 6 
R.F.L.5th 83, 90 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 2000) (Quinn, J. stating, “[h]eterosexual parenting is not better than 
lesbian parenting—just different.”) 
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Although federal politicians could have left the issue of same-sex 
marriage to be resolved by the courts and allowed the different cases to 
proceed to the Supreme Court of Canada, there was intense pressure for 
Parliament to become involved in dealing with this issue. Social and 
religious conservatives were demanding action to protect the traditional 
definition of marriage, while gay and lesbian advocates, along with their 
liberal religious and civil liberties supporters, were advocating that the 
government abandon any appeals and enact legislation to permit same-
sex marriage everywhere in the country. 
In 2001, the federal Liberal government had responded to M. v. H. 
with the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, which amended 
sixty-eight federal statutes to recognize as “common-law partners . . . two 
persons who are cohabiting in a conjugal relationship”73 for at least one 
year. This extended to homosexual partners the same rights and 
obligations as were already afforded to unmarried opposite-sex partners 
for purposes such as federal income tax law and federal pension plan 
eligibility. At that time, however, the Liberal government also felt 
political pressure to reaffirm its commitment to the traditional definition 
of marriage. Thus, the federal statute specified that “[f]or greater 
certainty, the amendments . . . do not affect the meaning of the word 
‘marriage,’ that is, the lawful union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others.”74  
After the 2003 Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Halpern, federal 
politicians had a limited range of options. One was to appeal Halpern to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, but a growing number of court decisions75 
had concluded that the Charter requires recognition of same-sex 
marriage, and the outcome of an appeal seemed a foregone conclusion. 
Further, there was growing pressure within the Liberal government to not 
be seen to be taking an “anti-Charter” position. Although some 
politicians favored a “civil union” compromise, the court decisions had 
explicitly stated that any response which restricted “marriage” to 
opposite-sex partners and only allowed homosexuals to have a registered 
domestic partnership would violate section 15 of the Charter; separate 
 73. 2000 S.C., ch. 12 § 2(3) (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. § 1.1; see also Federal Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, 2001 S.C., ch. 4, § 
5 (Can.) (marriage requires the free and enlightened consent of a man and a woman to be the spouse 
of the other). 
 75. See, e.g., EGALE v. Canada, [2003] 13 B.C.L.R. 1 (rendered a few weeks before 
Halpern). The British Columbia Court of Appeal also ruled that section 15 of the Charter was 
violated by denying same-sex partners the right to marry, but the decision received less attention 
because the Court initially suspended the granting of a remedy for two years in order to give 
Parliament time to act. That suspension was revoked after the Halpern decision was rendered by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. 
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treatment of homosexual intimate unions was not equal treatment. 
Further, under section 92(12) of Canada’s Constitution Act, 
responsibility for the “solemnization of marriage” (e.g., the form of 
ceremony, the appointment of celebrants, registration) is a provincial 
responsibility, so the federal Parliament could not enact legislation that 
dealt with registration as an alternative to a ceremony. 
One federal option was to use the “Notwithstanding Clause” to 
preserve the traditional definition of marriage. Under Canada’s 
Constitution, Parliament may override a Charter based right for a five 
year period by enacting ordinary legislation which explicitly invokes the 
“Notwithstanding Clause,”76 thus permitting Parliament to effectively 
override Charter-based court decisions. This would allow Parliament to 
deny same-sex partners the right to marry. However, there is great 
reluctance to invoke this explicitly rights-denying constitutional 
provision, and it has never been used by the federal Parliament. Even 
conservative politicians opposed to same-sex marriage were reluctant to 
advocate using the “Notwithstanding Clause.” 
Within a week of the rendering of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
judgment in Halpern, the Prime Minister announced that the government 
was in principle supportive of same-sex marriage and it would not appeal 
the lower court decisions requiring recognition of same-sex marriage. 
However, reflecting the divisions over the issue, the government also 
decided that prior to having Parliament vote on legislation to allow same-
sex couples to marry, a reference case would be brought before the 
Supreme Court of Canada to answer some questions about the 
constitutionality of the proposed law.77
In its December 2004 decision Reference Re: Same-Sex Marriage,78 
the Supreme Court answered the three least contentious questions posed 
by the federal government, making clear that the federal government 
could enact such a law and that no religious celebrant could be required 
to perform a marriage ceremony for a same-sex couple. This question 
was posed to reassure some of the critics of same-sex marriage, who 
raised the specter of clerics being forced to perform same-sex 
marriages—contrary to their faiths. This question is purely theoretical, as 
 76. Charter of Rights, § 33. See discussion of Peter Hogg, So, Where Do We Go From Here?, 
THE GLOBE & MAIL, Dec.15, 2004 at A25; Open Letter to The Hon. Stephen Harper from Law 
Professors Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/samesex 
letter.html (last visited June 15, 2005). 
 77. See, e.g., Janice Tibbetts, Ottawa to Legalize Gay Marriage, NAT’L POST, June 18, 2003 
at A5. In Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has original jurisdiction in dealing with 
constitutional questions that the federal government may choose to “refer” to the Court for answers; 
this is known as a “reference case.” This is not done frequently. 
 78. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
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there have in fact been no cases of gays or lesbians in Canada seeking to 
compel a religious celebrant to perform a marriage ceremony. 
Although answering three of the questions posed, the Supreme Court 
in Reference took the unusual step of declining to answer the most 
contentious question posed by the federal government; whether the 
Charter requires recognition of same-sex marriage. The Court reasoned 
that since the federal government had stated its intention to address the 
issue of same-sex marriage legislatively regardless of the Court’s 
opinion, it should not answer a purely “hypothetical question.” Arguably, 
the judges in the Supreme Court were reluctant to be seen as imposing a 
controversial law on the country, and preferred to let the politicians “take 
the heat.” Despite declining to explicitly answer this question, the 
Supreme Court signaled its support for same-sex marriage, noting the 
importance of the “protection” of the rights already acquired by same-sex 
partners who had married after Halpern and similar decisions in other 
jurisdictions in Canada. 
By the time of the Supreme Court Reference, Prime Minister Martin 
came to view same-sex marriage as a human rights issue, and the 
government brought the Civil Marriage Act (Bill C-38) to Parliament in 
February, 2005, to define a “civil marriage” as “the lawful union of two 
persons to the exclusion of all others.”79 In the spring of 2005, there was 
intense lobbying of members of Parliament over same-sex marriage, with 
demonstrations, advertising and letter writing campaigns. Much of the 
anti-same-sex marriage advocacy was undertaken by conservative, faith-
based groups, including the prominent American Christian organization 
Focus on the Family.80 More liberal faith groups and civil liberties 
organizations supported changing the definition of marriage to allow 
same-sex partners to marry. There were Parliamentary Committee 
hearings and extensive media debates over same-sex marriage. Although 
no party had a majority in Parliament, and some Members of Parliament 
in the governing Liberal Party opposed same-sex marriage, an even 
larger number of opposition MP’s supported Bill C-38, and it was passed 
by the House of Commons by a vote of 158 to 133 on June 28, 2005.81 
The new marriage law came into force on July 20, 2005, after passage by 
the Senate. 
 79. Bill C-38, § 2, 38th Parliament, 1st Sess. (3d Reading, June 28, 2005,). 
 80. See, e.g., Oliver Moore, Tory Same-Sex Motion Rejected, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 12, 
2005; Peter Kuitenbrouwer, Faiths Join Ranks at Rally for Traditional Marriage, NAT’L POST, May 
24, 2005, at A1; Melissa Leong, Muslim, Christian Groups Oppose Gay Marriage, NAT’L POST, 
Apr. 5, 2005, at A5; and Tim Naumetz, House Order May End Debate on Same-Sex Bill, NAT’L 
POST, May 30, 2005, at A4. 
 81. Tim Naumetz, For Better or Worse: Same-Sex Marriage Law Passes Commons, NAT’L 
POST, June 29, 2005, at A1. 
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In order to ensure that religious supporters of the traditional 
definition of marriage would not be penalized, an amendment was added 
to Bill C-38 before it was enacted. The amendment specifies that no 
religious body shall lose its charitable status under the Income Tax Act 
because it refuses to perform same-sex marriages.82 Bill C-38 was also 
carefully drafted to use the term “civil marriage.” While a registered 
religious celebrant may perform a faith-based same-sex marriage 
ceremony that will have the same effect as a legal marriage, a religious 
celebrant is also free to refuse to perform such a ceremony.83
The largest opposition party in Parliament at that time, the 
Conservatives, almost all voted against Bill C-38, and Party leader 
Stephen Harper pledged that if elected Prime Minister, he would bring 
back the issue of same-sex marriage to Parliament for another “free 
vote.” In the January 2006 federal election, the Conservatives won 
enough seats to form a minority government, and Stephen Harper, who is 
now Prime Minster, has stated that he will bring back the issue of 
restricting the definition of marriage to a man and a woman. However, a 
majority of Canadians now accept same-sex marriage, and surveys of 
newly elected Members of Parliament clearly indicate that a majority in 
Parliament will not vote to reverse the earlier legislative decision.84 
Further, given the Charter-based court decisions on this issue and the 
apparent unwillingness of the Conservatives to invoke the 
Notwithstanding Clause, which even the opponents of same-sex marriage 
are reluctant to advocate, there is no effective way to end same-sex 
marriage in Canada. 
Same-sex marriage has been very controversial in Canada, though a 
number of public opinion polls have shown that a clear, but narrow 
majority of Canadians support same-sex marriage, with greater support 
amongst the young and urban voters. As a result of constitutional 
litigation, the Canadian courts prodded reluctant politicians to take action 
on a controversial issue, but the position of the courts and the politicians 
 82. Bill C-38, § 11.1, 38th Parliament, 1st Sess. (3d Reading, June 28, 2005). 
 83. Depending on provincial law or policy, civil officials who perform marriages may be 
required to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies. In a number of provinces, government policy 
accommodates marriage commissioners who refuse to perform such same-sex marriage ceremonies. 
However, in Newfoundland, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, marriage commissioners who refuse to 
perform such ceremonies have been dismissed; this is the subject of a human rights compliant in 
Saskatchewan based on discrimination based on religion. See Gloria Galloway, Refused Gays Rites, 
Marriage Official Expects To Get Axe, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 19, 2005, at A4. 
 84. See Same-sex Vote Likely to be Tight, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1 (reporting 
on a survey revealing that a clear, but narrow majority of MPs would vote to retain same-sex 
marriage); see also Don Martin, The Wit and Wisdom of a Candid John Crosbie, NAT’L POST, Aug. 
18, 2005, at A12 (offering an explanation of why even conservatives are questioning the political 
wisdom of attempting to reopen the same-sex marriage issue). 
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was consistent with the views of a majority of Canadians.85 The 
introduction of same-sex marriage in Canada has been motivated by a 
desire to respect the equality and human dignity of all Canadians, and in 
particular to recognize the social and emotional importance of the 
conjugal relationships of homosexuals. This development also has 
considerable social value, as it promotes the interests of children who are 
being parented by same-sex partners, and it shifts some burdens which 
might otherwise fall on the state onto private shoulders. 
The practical effects of the recognition of same-sex marriage were 
limited. Same-sex partners who cohabit in a conjugal relationship already 
had many of the rights and obligations of married partners. Whether they 
are married or have the status of a cohabiting couple, same-sex partners 
are much less likely to have children and more likely to have an 
egalitarian relationship than opposite-sex partners.86 Hence, there is less 
likely to be the sort of dependency that could, for example, give rise to a 
claim for spousal support if the relationship breaks down. Further, it is 
clear that for a variety of social, psychological, and legal reasons, only a 
minority of homosexuals in long-term relationships will exercise the 
right to marry in the foreseeable future.87 Nevertheless, the recognition of 
same-sex marriage is of profound symbolic significance, both for 
advocates and opponents.88 The court decisions about same-sex marriage 
and the ultimate government response recognize the fundamental right of 
gays and lesbians to full equality under the law and provide important 
social validation of these relationships.89 For opponents of same-sex 
 85. It would appear that some politicians in the United States, such as California’s Governor 
Schwarzenegger, would also prefer to have the courts make decisions about such controversial 
issues. See Dean E. Murphy, Schwarzenegger to Veto Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2005, at A18. 
 86. See Ross v. Reaney, [2003] O.J. No. 2366 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (court awarded interim spousal 
support at the end of a conjugal same-sex relationship). 
 87. It is estimated that over 4000 same-sex marriages were performed in Canada by the 
spring of 2005 (females outnumbering males by a ratio of about 2:1). This is only a small fraction of 
the gays and lesbians in those two provinces in long term relationships who might have chosen to 
marry, and as many as one third of those who married are from outside of Canada, primarily the 
United States. Since a number of provinces are not keeping track of same-sex versus opposite-sex 
marriages, there will not be accurate national statistics on the number of same-sex marriages in 
Canada until the 2006 census data. See, e.g., Naumetz, supra note 2. 
 88. See, e.g., Didi Herman, Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women’s Liberation, 28 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 789, 797 (1990) (a Canadian lesbian scholar, argues that the recognition of 
same-sex “marriage” may “support . . . the very institutional structures that perpetuate and create 
women’s oppression. Our reliance on the language of monogamy, cohabitation, life-long 
commitment and other essentials of bona fide heterosexual coupledom may divide us”). More social 
research into gay and lesbian family behaviors is needed; as social attitudes and legal rules change, it 
is likely that homosexuals will be more willing to be candid with researchers and that some of these 
patterns of behavior may change as well. 
 89. See, e.g., Ron Levy, Expressive Harms and the Strands of Charter Equality: Drawing 
Out Parallel Coherent Approaches to Discrimination, 40 ALTA. L. REV. 393 (2002). 
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marriage, most of whom are older or more conservative, the issue brings 
to the surface concerns about social change and a decline in the influence 
of traditional mores in Canadian society.90
Although same-sex partners were historically denied the rights and 
obligations of marriage, the denial of the psychological, social, 
economic, and legal benefits of marriage has now been recognized by the 
courts as a violation of “human dignity” under section 15 of the Charter. 
While there are differences between “typical” same-sex and opposite-sex 
conjugal relationships, same-sex conjugal relationships serve profoundly 
important social, psychological, spiritual, and economic functions, and it 
is now accepted in Canada that they merit the same legal recognition as 
opposite-sex conjugal relationships. 
 
V.  RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Historically, homosexuals very likely faced similar levels of 
discrimination and social hostility in Canada as in the United States, but 
over the past decade, gays and lesbians in the Unites States have had 
greater difficulty in gaining legal recognition for their relationships. Even 
in the United States, however, there has been very significant legal 
change over the past decade. 
Canada’s Parliament repealed in 1969 its criminal laws making 
homosexual acts between consenting adults an offense, but in 1986, the 
United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick upheld the 
constitutional validity of a Georgia statute which made sodomy an 
offense.91 At that time, about half of the states made engaging in 
homosexual acts a criminal offense. While a number of states repealed 
these laws in the following years, in 2003, when the United States 
Supreme Court decided to overrule Bowers, more than a dozen states still 
retained these highly discriminatory statutes. In its 2003 decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,92 the majority of the Supreme Court held that the 
Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law was unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy 
held that the “liberty interest” encompasses a number of freedoms, 
including freedom of adults to engage in intimate sexual conduct in their 
homes. He held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against 
“unwarranted government intrusions” into the home, observing that the 
state laws being challenged sought to control “the most private human 
 90. See, e.g., Matthew Mendelson, Same-Sex Solitudes, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 23, 2003, 
at A17. 
 91. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 92. Laurence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. 
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or 
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”93 Justice 
Kennedy was careful to limit the decision to the criminal context. 
However, in his dissent Justice Scalia noted the Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision in Halpern, decided just a few weeks before, and observed that 
the reasoning of the majority “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws 
limiting marriage to opposite sex couples.” 
While in Canada the federal government has primary jurisdiction 
over the same-sex marriage issue and much of family law, in the United 
States most family law matters and the recognition of same-sex marriage 
are dealt with at the state level, often in the context of state constitutions. 
There are significant similarities in the state constitutions in their general 
articulation of protections for liberty and equality (and indeed between 
those statements and the words of Canada’s Charter of Rights), but 
generally, each state supreme court is the final arbiter of that state’s 
constitution, and different courts may give very different interpretations 
to similar words. Further, as discussed below, a number of state 
constitutions have recently been amended by referenda to explicitly 
prohibit same-sex marriage. 
The first constitutional challenges in the United States to the 
traditional definition of marriage date to the 1970s,94 but it was only in 
1996 that any of these challenges were successful. In 1996, a Hawaii trial 
court held that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the 
state constitution because it discriminated on the basis of sex.95 Before an 
appeal could be completed, the voters of Hawaii passed a state 
constitutional amendment to allow the state legislature to limit marriage 
to opposite-sex couples. There was a similar, later development in 
Alaska where a trial court held that the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the right to marry violated the state constitution’s provisions 
assuring a right to privacy and the right to be free from discrimination on 
the basis of sex,96 but as in Hawaii, the Alaska constitution was amended 
in a referendum to define marriage as the union of one man and one 
woman, ending that legal challenge. 
After these challenges to the traditional definition of marriage, and 
with growing concerns about the possible response of “activist judges” to 
 93. Id. at 567. 
 94. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1974). 
 95. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
 96. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
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future challenges, in 1996, the United States Congress enacted the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).97 This law provides that for all 
purposes of federal law, “marriage” means “a legal union between one 
man and one woman.” This limits the practical effect of any state 
decisions recognizing same-sex marriage, as it means that for such 
purposes as federal income tax, immigration, and social security, these 
marriages will not be recognized. Further, DOMA is intended to reaffirm 
the power of states to make their own decisions about the meaning of 
marriage within their state, providing that no state “shall be required” to 
give legal effect to a same-sex marriage entered into in another state. 
This law was passed by wide margins in Congress, which gives an 
indication of the views of a majority of politicians in the United States 
about same-sex marriage. However, there are concerns about the 
constitutionality of this federal law, as there are arguments that it 
infringes state jurisdiction over family law and may be inconsistent with 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires 
recognition by the courts of judgments rendered in other states.98 As a 
result of these concerns, some conservative politicians, including 
President Bush, are calling for a Federal Marriage Protection 
Amendment to the United States Constitution to “protect marriage in 
America”99 by having a constitutional provision that would be similar to 
DOMA, though at present there does not seem to be sufficient political 
support to adopt such an amendment. 
In 1999, in Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the 
state’s failure to provide committed same-sex partners with the benefits 
and privileges granted to married couples violated the Common Benefits 
Clause of the Vermont State Constitution (a provision similar to the 
Equal Protection Clause in the U.S. Constitution and to the Equality 
Provision in section 15 of Canada’s Charter).100 The Vermont Supreme 
Court cited some of the Canadian jurisprudence, and directed the state 
legislature to remedy this constitutional infringement, though allowing 
the legislature to decide whether to create an equivalent institution to 
marriage or allow same-sex partners to marry. In response to the Court’s 
decision, the Vermont legislature enacted a law permitting same-sex 
couples to enter into “civil unions,” which give same-sex partners who 
register all of the rights and obligations of married persons under state 
 97. Pub. L. No.104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1997)). 
 98. See, e.g., Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-
Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684 (2004). 
 99. See George W. Bush, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting 
Marriage, Feb. 24, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html (last 
visited June 10, 2005) (statements of President Bush about need for a constitutional amendment). 
 100. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
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law, such as rights upon separation. Further, third parties, like 
businesses, are required to treat marriages and civil unions equally. 
However, persons in a civil union are not granted any of the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage under federal law. 
In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in a four to three split 
decision, that denying marriage and its protections to same-sex couples 
violates the Equality and Liberty provisions of the Massachusetts State 
Constitution.101 The court mainly discussed American jurisprudence, but 
it also cited some of the Canadian same-sex marriage decisions, 
including Halpern, and concluded: 
 
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real 
segment of the community for no rational reason. The absence of any 
reasonable relationship between, on the one hand, an absolute 
disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil 
marriage and, on the other, protection of public health, safety, or 
general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in 
persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to 
be) homosexual. . . . Limiting the protections, benefits, and obligations 
of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of 
individual liberty and equality under law protected by the 
Massachusetts Constitution.102
 
The court construed “civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two 
persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others,” and gave the 
legislature eighty days to comply with the ruling. 
In January 2004, the Massachusetts State Senate asked the Supreme 
Judicial Court whether a law allowing same-sex couples to enter into 
civil unions would comply with the court’s opinion in Goodridge. The 
court rendered an advisory opinion making clear that civil unions would 
not provide full equality to same-sex couples as mandated by the 
Massachusetts constitution. The court stated that having a separate 
institution for same-sex couples would compound, not correct, the 
constitutional infirmity. The court wrote that establishing a separate 
“civil union” status for same-sex couples “would have the effect of 
maintaining and fostering a stigma of exclusion that the [Massachusetts] 
Constitution prohibits.”103 The state of Massachusetts began granting 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004, though these 
 101. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004). 
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same-sex marriages are not recognized for purposes of federal law. 
After Goodridge, challenges by same-sex partners claiming a 
violation of state constitutions as a result of denial of their right to marry 
failed in Arizona and Indiana. In California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, similar cases based 
on claims under state constitutions are proceeding through the courts.104 
Although in one case a New York state trial judge initially ruled in favor 
of the same-sex partner applicants, the ruling was later reversed by the 
Appellate Division, and two other judges in the same state have also 
ruled against the applicants.105 In June 2005, an intermediate state appeal 
court in New Jersey rejected a claim by same-sex partners seeking the 
right to marry, summarizing many of the arguments that have been used 
to reject these claims: 
 
[P]laintiffs have failed to identify any source in the text of the New 
Jersey Constitution, the history of the institution of marriage or 
contemporary social standards for their claim that the Constitution 
mandates State recognition of marriage between members of the same 
sex. . . . . [O]ur society and laws view marriage as something more than 
just State recognition of a committed relationship between two adults. 
Our leading religions view marriage as a union of men and women 
recognized by God, . . . and our society considers marriage between a 
man and woman to play a vital role in propagating the species and in 
providing the ideal environment for raising children.106
 
It will likely take many months before any of these cases reach their state 
supreme courts, but it is far from certain that the success of gay and 
lesbian advocates in Massachusetts and Vermont will be repeated in 
other states. 
It is not surprising that the two state supreme courts which have been 
most receptive to claims by gays and lesbians of the right to marry have 
been in two of the most liberal states, Vermont and Massachusetts, and 
even there, the decisions were controversial. It is interesting to observe 
that in Massachusetts, immediately after the Goodridge decision was 
 104. These cases and similar developments are tracked on a number of websites. See, e.g., 
http://www.nclrights.org/publications/marriage_equality0305.htm (National Centre for Lesbian 
Rights) and http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/record2?record=9 (Lambda Legal). 
 105. Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) rev’d, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005). For other decisions dismissing applications, see Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 
N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Kane v. Marsolais, RJI#01-04-ST4671, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 
2005), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/press/KAN4SAME%20SEX%20DECISION.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2005), aff’d 2006 N.Y. slip op. 01214 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb 16, 2006); and Shields v. 
Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 106. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 268–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div, 2005). 
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rendered, state politicians opposed to the ruling began the process of 
trying to have the state constitution amended to prevent same-sex 
marriage. However, since the decision has been in effect, support for 
same-sex marriage has increased markedly in the state,107 and the efforts 
to amend the Massachusetts state Constitution to ban same-sex marriage 
may be stalling.108
Conservative and religious political groups are much more powerful 
in the United States109 than in Canada, and these groups have mobilized 
to oppose same-sex marriage, and the “judicial activism” that might lead 
to its imposition. In eighteen states, referenda have been held to amend 
their state constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage. The votes against 
the recognition of same-sex marriage have passed by wide margins, and 
the process of constitutional change has been commenced in at least a 
dozen other states.110 The fact that a state constitution has been amended 
to reaffirm that marriage is defined as the “union of a man and a woman” 
or to prevent courts from recognizing out of state same-sex marriages 
makes it more difficult for advocates to succeed in gaining same-sex 
marriage either through litigation or by the process of having legislation 
enacted. The wording and nature of these constitutional provisions 
varies, however, and in Nebraska it was possible to persuade a federal 
court to have a voter ratified amendment to a state constitution struck 
down for violating the U.S. Constitution, as being so broad and 
destructive of rights as to violate the federal Constitution’s Equal 
Protection guarantees and hence was invalid.111
In California, a 2000 amendment to the state constitution which 
provided that the state would only “recognize” marriages between a man 
and a woman has not prevented constitutional litigation to achieve same-
sex marriage within the state or efforts to have the state Legislature 
amend the state family law code to define marriage as between “two 
persons,” as it is being argued that the amendment only bans recognition 
 107. Support for same-sex marriage in Massachusetts increased from 40% at the time that the 
decision was rendered to 62% a year and a half later. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Recent 
State Polls on Same-Sex Marriage & Civil Unions, 5–7, http://www.thetaskforce.org/ 
downloads/RecentStateMay2005.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2005). 
 108. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A14. 
 109. See, e.g., Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem With Gay Marriage? (It’s the Gay 
Part), N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 19, 2005. 
 110. See Charisse Jones, Gay-Marriage Debate Still Intense a Year Later, USA TODAY, May 
17, 2005, at A1. 
 111. A very broad amendment to the Nebraska Constitution which banned not merely same-
sex marriage but also any legal recognition of any form of “civil union, domestic partnership, or 
other similar same-sex relationship” has been held by a Federal Court to violate the U.S. 
Constitution. See Judge Voids Same-Sex Marriage Ban in Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005. 
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of out-of-state same-sex marriages.112 Reflecting changing public 
sentiments in the state, in September 2005, the California Legislative 
Assembly and Senate voted in favor of a law that would allow same-sex 
marriage. In vetoing the gay marriage bill in California, Governor 
Schwarzenegger has indicated that he will leave it to the California 
courts to deal with this contentious issue. While at the time of writing it 
is uncertain of how the issue will be resolved in California, it is clear that 
political and judicial sentiments in this liberal state are becoming more 
receptive to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.113
More than a dozen American states have enacted “registered 
domestic partnership” (or “civil union”) laws, which are intended to 
confer specified rights and responsibilities on couples who choose to 
register with the state, and provide for some process for resolution of 
disputes upon the termination of such a relationship.114 While in a 
number of states these laws allow any two unmarried adults to register, 
these laws are clearly directed at same-sex couples, with the intent of 
giving them specified rights, and at least some security and recognition 
for their relationships. In Vermont, the civil union law was enacted as a 
result of constitutional litigation and a court order, but in most states 
these laws have been enacted by the legislature in some response to 
political advocacy, not litigation. Some states, such as Vermont, 
Connecticut, and California, have civil union laws that give registered 
same-sex partners virtually all or most of the same rights and 
responsibilities as married couples, to the extent permitted under state 
law. Other states, such as Hawaii, confer only a limited range of rights, 
in particular focusing on medical treatment decisions and upon death of a 
partner; these narrower laws were generally enacted in response to 
concerns about how gay couples could deal with the AIDS crisis. Some 
cities have also enacted domestic partnership laws that, for example, 
allow municipal employees to register to gain status for purposes of 
giving employment benefits to a partner. None of these state and 
municipal laws confer any status under federal law, and there are 
questions about how much recognition any of these unions will have 
outside the state in which the parties registered. 
Perhaps the most significant and intense aspects of the debate over 
the “M word” are symbolic and emotional rather than practical. A 
 112. See, e.g., California Gay Marriage Bill Clears One Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005. 
 113. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Peterson, Conservatives Lash Out At Arnold Over Gay Marriage, 
365GAY.COM, Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/09/091205 
arnold.htm. 
 114. See, e.g., National Center for Lesbian Rights, Marriage Equality Factsheet: An Overview 
of Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex Couples in the United States, http://www.nclrights.org/ 
publications/marriage_equality0305.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
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number of prominent conservative politicians, like President George W. 
Bush, say that they are not against gays and lesbians and appear willing 
to accept significant legal recognition of same-sex relationships through 
domestic partnership laws, but they also feel that it is necessary to take 
steps to “preserve marriage.”115 Opinion polls in the United States 
generally show a substantial majority of the public is opposed to same-
sex marriage, but also in favor of some form of domestic partnership 
law.116 While from a practical perspective broadly drafted domestic 
partnership statutes, such as those in Vermont and California, give 
significant legal recognition to same-sex relationships, from a symbolic 
and emotional perspective there is still a substantial difference between 
“marriage” and a “domestic partnership,” both for those who enter into 
them and for society as a whole. It is, however, also significant to 
appreciate that prominent opponents of same-sex marriage now feel 
obliged to speak in support of civil unions and avoid making openly 
derogatory comments about gays and lesbians: the “center of gravity” on 
the debate over the legal recognition of gays and lesbians in the United 
States has significantly shifted. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION: REDEFINING MARRIAGE IN CANADA & THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Marriage is one of the oldest, most universal and important of social 
and legal institutions. It has, however, dramatically changed over the 
course of recorded history, and today there is great variation around the 
world in the laws and mores of marriage in different countries. 
Marriage for opposite-sex partners in North America is increasingly 
considered a relationship of equals without legal recognition of 
distinctive gender roles. Marriage, procreation, and child-rearing are 
becoming less closely intertwined, with fewer children being raised in 
marital relationships, more children being raised by single parents, and a 
growing number of children being raised by same-sex couples. There is 
also a growing commitment to ending discrimination, including that 
based on sexual orientation. These developments have all helped fuel the 
movement towards legal recognition of same-sex partnerships in North 
America. There are, however, significant differences in Canada and the 
United States in the progress towards legal recognition of same-sex 
 115. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Says His Party Is Wrong To Oppose Gay Civil Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A21. 
 116. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Recent Public Opinion Polls on Same-Sex 
Marriage & Civil Unions, at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/RecentStateMay2005.pdf (last 
visited August 20, 2005). 
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relationships. In Canada, same-sex partners have the full right to marry, 
while nowhere in the United States can same-sex partners enter into a 
marriage with a fully equivalent status as opposite-sex married partners, 
and only one state at present allows for state-sanctioned same-sex 
“marriage.” 
One interesting aspect to a comparison in developments in the two 
countries is the relationship between the development of the law and 
public opinion. While the words of American constitutional documents 
are very similar to those in Canada, the political reality is that there is 
greater public opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States. For 
all of the complex constitutional argumentation, in some important ways 
American courts are simply reflecting the policies favored by a more 
conservative, more religious populace, while Canadian courts are 
reflecting the more liberal sentiments and values of a majority of the 
Canadian people. It is far from coincidental that the American 
jurisdictions where the state courts have been most receptive to 
recognizing same-sex relationships are also the most politically liberal. 
Developments in the two countries also reveal an interesting 
relationship between legal change and attitudinal change. It is very 
difficult to effect sudden, dramatic legal change, even through litigation, 
in the face of the opposition of a majority of the population, but gradual 
legal change can help to change social attitudes, which can in turn help 
produce support further legal change. It seems very unlikely that a 
society can be quickly changed from one having laws that criminalize 
homosexual acts into one that recognizes same-sex marriage. There need 
to be some intermediate stages to allow time for social attitudes to 
change in response to new legal realities and to more socially visible 
same-sex relationships.117 The litigation experience in Canada in the 
1990s suggests that a constitutionally based claim for same-sex marriage 
is more likely to succeed if it is the culmination of a series of 
discrimination based claims. It is legally and politically easier to start 
with discrimination based claims in the economic sphere, and with 
changes that clearly advance the interests of children (such as allowing 
lesbian de facto parents access to children whom they have parented). If 
the Canadian courts had started in the 1990s with decisions requiring 
same-sex marriage, they would have been very much out-of-step with 
public opinion, but by the time that the courts in Canada began to make 
same-sex marriage decisions in the new millennium, public opinion had 
 117. KEES WAALDIJK, Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-
Sex Partners in Europe, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 62, 62 (2000) (arguing that European experience reveals 
a “standard sequence” of decriminalization, followed by anti-discrimination provisions, and then 
partnership legislation, and perhaps finally, same-sex marriage). 
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shifted, at least in part because earlier decisions on less contentious 
situations of discrimination helped to change social attitudes. 
While there are significant similarities in family law in Canada and 
the United States, there are also some substantial differences.118 In 
general, the laws of the United States take a narrower approach to the 
recognition of familial relationships that give rise to rights and 
obligations. There is greater legal recognition in Canada for unmarried 
opposite-sex cohabitation and for the role of step-parents. Conversely, 
marriage and biological parentage play a greater role in family law in the 
United States, so it is understandable that changing the definition of 
“marriage” is more difficult in the United States. Despite the differences 
in the pace of change, the United States is also moving towards greater 
recognition of same-sex relationships, with even President Bush seeming 
to accept that there may be some form of domestic partnerships for gays 
and lesbians, but the movement towards recognition of same-sex 
marriage is clearly progressing more slowly and much more unevenly 
than in Canada. 
It is also interesting to note the effect of the different division of 
powers provisions in the two countries. In Canada, the issue of same-sex 
marriage is a federal issue; this has resulted in liberal judges and 
politicians imposing same-sex marriage on some of the more 
conservative parts of the country, like Alberta, where a majority of the 
population is still clearly opposed to same-sex marriage. In the United 
States, family law is largely a state issue. This has allowed at least 
limited forms of recognition of same-sex relationships to be achieved in 
some of the more liberal states, where there is the most significant 
support, without any direct threat to the legal regime in more 
conservative states. If same-sex marriage were a federal issue in the 
United States, it would be much more difficult to ever achieve legislative 
recognition for same-sex relationships. Given the more conservative and 
religious nature of American society, it may be many years before same-
sex marriage is accepted in a majority of American states. However, the 
experience with same-sex marriage in Canada and such states as 
Massachusetts suggests that the coming years may also serve to 
demonstrate to Americans that there is no danger and much potential 
value in giving equal treatment to gay and lesbian partners and their 
children. 
Like prior debates in the family law field over such fundamental 
issues as no-fault divorce, the debates over same-sex marriage are 
 118. For a somewhat dated but still largely valid comparison, see Nicholas Bala, Family Law 
in Canada and the U.S.A.: Different Visions of Similar Realities, 1 INT’L J. L. & FAM. 1 (1987). 
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occurring simultaneously in different countries. As with those earlier 
debates, the direction of change seems clear, at least in Western nations, 
but the pace of change varies greatly, and different countries will have 
different resolutions to the controversies. These debates are intense and 
widely engaging because they involve not only politicians, justice system 
professionals, academics, and those directly affected by any legal 
change. Rather, the controversy has a deep resonance, as it raises 
questions about the role of religion in a modern society and the nature of 
an institution which is of fundamental personal importance to almost 
everyone. 
 
